【摘要】 企业党委是经营管理活动的领导核心和重要监督力量，本文以2005—2018年A股上市公司为样本，探究了党委参与公司治理的核心制度安排“党政一肩挑”——党委书记兼任董事长对于股价崩盘风险的影响。结果显示，“党政一肩挑”治理模式能够显著降低上市公司股价崩盘风险，这一影响主要集中于董事长管理能力较强、党委书记政治晋升预期较强、内部代理问题严重、外部监督力量薄弱、股票价值稳定性较差的样本中。最后，“党政一肩挑”治理模式能够通过提高投资效率进一步降低股价崩盘风险，同时也强化了上市公司党委对社会和公众利益的保护。更多还原

【Abstract】 Party committees in the firms have become the political core and important supervisory force of managerial activities. Based on the sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2005 to 2018, this paper studies the impact of duality of party committee secretary and chairman, the core institutional arrangement of party committee’s participation in corporate governance, on the stock price crash risk. The results show that duality of party committee secretary and chairman in the listed firms can significantly decrease the stock price crash risk, which mainly focuses on the samples with stronger managerial ability of chairman, stronger political promotion expectation of party committee secretary, more serious internal agency problems, weaker external supervision and lower stability of stock valuation. The final path tests show that duality of party committee secretary and chairman can decrease the stock price crash risk by improving investment efficiency, and also strengthen the protection of social and public interests.更多还原