节点文献

全球弱总量约束下的碳市场制度完善路径——以全球温室气体总量控制为视角

The Paths to Improve Carbon Market Rules under the Weak Global Control on Total Emission: From the Perspective of Global Cap of Greenhouse Gases

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 吕忠梅尤明青

【Author】 Lyu Zhongmei;You Mingqing;Civil,Commercial and Economic Law School,China University of Political Science and Law;School of Law,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;

【通讯作者】 尤明青;

【机构】 中国政法大学民商经济法学院中南财经政法大学法学院

【摘要】 大气温室气体容量具有公共资源的属性,表现在其使用的竞争性与非排他性,需要实施总量控制。《巴黎协定》之后的大气温室气体控制存在全球弱总量约束与碎片化强总量控制之间的矛盾。全球层面总量控制制度经历了从《京都议定书》到《巴黎协定》的弱化过程。部分国家和地区的总量硬约束具有碎片化特征,对排放交易制度的长期有效运行具有消极影响。中国应当统筹推进国际国内制度,在国际上推动全球温室气体总量控制和大气温室气体容量使用权的公正分配,积极参与制定国际规则,准确把握中国在国际碳市场中的定位,通过“一带一路”等多边合作机制构建区域碳市场,以区域碳市场制度建设推动全球碳市场制度建设。国内碳市场制度建设应当分步推进,实体规则应当坚持自主性,程序规则应当侧重国际兼容性。

【Abstract】 The atmospheric content for GHGs is public resources in that its use is competitive but not exclusive, so the control on total emission is needed. The legal regime for the control on atmospheric greenhouse gases(GHGs) has a conflict between global weak control and fragmented tight control on the total emission. The global control on total emission went through a weakening process from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol stressed total control but different degrees for Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries. The Kyoto Protocol in fact adopted a partial tight control on total emissions. Later negotiations abandoned this partial tight control on total emissions because the total control was partial, and some countries thought the control was too tight for them. The Paris Agreement is weak on the total control on emissions for market mechanisms in the following aspects: Firstly, allowing members to nationally determine their own emission caps means that it is impossible to set a cap at the global level. Secondly, the nationally determined emission caps do not necessarily cover all sectors of the economy. Thirdly, members may set an emission cap that does not need the assistance of external markets. Fourthly, the nationally determined emission caps are obligations of conduct instead of obligations of result. In contrary to the weakening of the total control on emissions at the global level, some countries, regions, and sectors tightened their internal control on total emissions. Currently carbon markets with such fragmented total control on emissions include regional markets such as EU ETS, sector markets such as Carbon Offsetting Scheme for International Aviation(CORSIA), national markets such the carbon markets of Korea, UK, and New Zealand, and sub-national markets such as Western Climate Initiative(WCI) and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative(RGGI). Fragmented control on total emissions affects the supply and demand, distorts the price,discourages those under tight control, hampers the linkage among international and domestic markets,and has negative impacts on the long-term effectiveness of the carbon market. China should take an integrated approach to promote the development of international and domestic rules on the carbon market. At the international level, China should promote the global total control on emissions and just distribution of emission quotas, actively participate in the making of international rules, take a correct position in the international market, develop regional carbon market through the Belt and Road Initiative and other international cooperation mechanisms, and promote the development of rules on global carbon market through the development of rules on regional carbon markets. Domestically, the development of carbon market rules may take three phases: Phase one is from now on to 2025, the main work being the making of administrative regulations and rules by the State Council and the incorporation of the goals of carbon peaking and neutrality in relevant legislations. The second phase is from 2026 to 2035, the main work being the making of Climate Law or Climate Change Law and making provision on carbon market in the legislation. The third phase is from 2036 to 2060, the main work being to further develop rules on carbon market. Distinction should be made between substantive rules and procedural rules. Substantive rules are the core. Substantive rules should reflect Chinese initiatives and embody Chinese exploration in developing rules for carbon market. China may use command-and-control rules, corrective taxes and subsidies, and tradable permits to promote the performance of carbon market rules. Procedural rules are corresponding facilitative rules and should be internationally compatible. Procedural rules mainly include rules on the calculation of GHG emissions, the calculation of emission reduction,reporting, registration in carbon market, and settling accounts.

【基金】 中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2722023DK018)
  • 【文献出处】 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版) ,Journal of Zhejiang University(Humanities and Social Sciences) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2023年11期
  • 【分类号】F832.5;X196
  • 【下载频次】154
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络