【摘要】 近年来，对上市公司违规行为的研究一直是学术界和监管机构关注的重点。违规行为在股东联结关联公司间存在显著的正向行为溢出效应，即关联公司的违规行为显著提高了存在股东联结公司发生违规行为的概率。上市公司违规决策的行为溢出效应主要来源于交流式学习机制和观察式学习机制。上市公司存在共同股东时，有更多的社会网络联结和社会活动联系，为股东联结关联公司间的交流式学习模仿奠定了基础。通过观察股东联结公司的违规行为造成的市场反应、受到的监管机构的处罚程度，上市公司决定是否实施类似的违规行为，形成观察式学习模仿。非国有企业、享受低政府补贴的企业和所在地市场化程度较高的企业，股东联结公司间的行为溢出效应更加明显。违规事件的行为溢出效应与监管强度负相关。监管强度越大，行为溢出效应越小。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of shareholder interlocked channels, this paper delves into the behavior spillover effect and influencing mechanism of violations among affiliated companies. This paper solves the endogenous problem of behavior spillover effect by controlling the proportion of the associated shareholder-interlocked companies disclosing the violations before the target listed company decides whether to engage in violations. Empirical evidence indicates that there is a significant positive behavior spillover effect among the shareholder-interlocked affiliates, i. e. the affiliates’ misconduct significantly increases the possibility of the shareholder-interlocked companies’ violations. Due to the great financing constraints, lack of cash flow and fierce market competition, non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with low government subsidies and a higher degree of marketization in their local areas are more motivated to observe and understand the violations of shareholder-interlocked affiliates, which leads to stronger spillover effect of violations. The behavior spillover effect of illegal decisions of listed companies results from the communicating learning mechanism and the observational learning mechanism. When there are common shareholders in listed companies, there are more social network ties and social activity connections, which lays a foundation for the communicating learning and imitation among shareholder-interlocked affiliated companies. By focusing on the market reaction caused by the irregularities of shareholder-interlocked companies and the severity of punishment imposed by the regulatory agency, the listed company decides whether to carry out similar irregularities, thus developing observational learning and imitation. If regulators step up their supervision, managers of listed companies will not be able to obtain high-quality projects or make large profits through illegal means, and meanwhile the penalties for companies that break the rules will be strengthened. Therefore,the introduction of the policy to enhance the supervision of securities institutions has played a vital role in restraining the spillover effect of violations among the stockholder-interlocked affiliated companies.The restraining effect of the policy is more powerful at the beginning. However, with the loosening of the implementation and regulators, the inhibitory effect of the policy gradually declines after the implementation of the policy for a period of time. The contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly,this paper discusses the factors that affect listed companies’ rule-breaking decisions from the perspective of social network connection. Secondly, from the perspective of the new interlocked channel of shareholders, this paper examines whether shareholders with the right of supervision and control will produce spillover effects of violations through the mechanism of communicating learning and observational learning. Thirdly, this paper finds that investors decide whether to imitate the behavior of other investors mainly by communicating with each other and comparing the costs and benefits of wrongdoing. Finally, the paper takes the introduction of the CPC Central Committee’s eight-point decisions as a measure of regulatory severity and examines the impact of institutional regulatory severity on the spillover effect of irregularities.更多还原