【摘要】 共享单车作为一项减少接触的出行方式在新冠疫情下逐渐受到大众的青睐，但骑行人数的增加也使得手部接触感染的风险倍增。为此，本文研究了政府部门是否对单车企业进行监管，以及企业是否建立完备防疫体系决策的动态演化博弈问题。通过构建二者的博弈模型，表征了四种情况下演化的均衡点，同时利用Matlab仿真分析了相关主要因素对演化均衡结果的影响。研究发现，政府部门罚款力度、疫情扩大概率、媒体曝光力度的提高都会使二者趋向于协同抗疫；政府部门补贴力度对演化结果影响并不显著，政府进行监管时应以惩罚为主，奖励为辅；二者防疫成本和对政府部门的问责力度都会影响演化结果。最后，就政府部门对共享单车企业疫情防控的监督机制提出相关建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a travel mode choice that can reduce contact between people, Bike-sharing has gradually been favored by the public under the COVID-19 epidemic. Nevertheless, with the increase in the number of cyclists, hand contact infection has been doubled and redoubled. Therefore, this paper studies the dynamic evolutionary game of whether the government should supervise the bicycle enterprises and whether the enterprises should establish a complete COVID-19 epidemic prevention system. By constructing the game model of the two, the equilibrium points of the evolution in four cases were characterized. The influence of the main factors on the results of the evolution equilibrium was analyzed by Matlab simulation. The results show that the government fines, the probability of the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic, and the media exposure will make the two tend to cooperate in fighting the COVID-19 epidemic. The intensity of government subsidies has no significant effect on the evolution results, and the government should prioritize punishment, supplemented by reward. The cost of COVID-19 epidemic prevention and the degree of accountability to the government will affect the evolution. Finally, relevant suggestions are put forward on the supervision mechanism of government departments for COVID-19 prevention and control of bikesharing enterprises.更多还原