【摘要】 针对集装箱海运链上的合作问题，考虑集装箱港口与班轮公司进行业务挂靠、合谋共利、班轮公司参与港口投资这三种不同的合作模式，运用伯川德博弈的方法，建模时考虑了港口设计吞吐能力所带来拥堵成本的影响，计算出班轮公司和集装箱港口的均衡定价、吞吐量及利润，对均衡结果进行比较，并对影响均衡结果的因素进行分析。结果表明，集装箱港口设计吞吐能力越大时拥堵成本越小，对集装箱海运链越有利；与业务挂靠模式相比，集装箱海运链更倾向于合谋共利；班轮公司对合作模式的均衡选择取决于投资港口扩大的吞吐能力大小；班轮公司定价需考虑自身投资港口的占比和拥堵程度；集装箱海运链吞吐量指标与班轮公司的投资占比和港口拥堵成本呈负相关。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper, in view of a container shipping chain, considering the three different modes of cooperation between the container port and liner company, namely business affiliation, joint planning for mutual gain, and investment by liner company in port construction, we used the Bertrand game method to study the influence of congestion cost due to limit in the design throughput capacity of the port, calculated the equilibrium pricing, throughput volume and profit of the liner company and the container port, and by comparing them with the equilibrium results, analyzed the influence factors relevant in this process. The result showed that the greater the design throughput capacity of the container port, the smaller the congestion cost, which is more beneficial to the container shipping chain; compared with the business affiliation mode, the container shipping chain is more inclined to joint planning for mutual gain; the liner company’s equilibrium choice of cooperation mode depends on the increase in the port’s throughput capacity from the investment; the liner company needs to consider their investment share in the port and the degree of congestion in its pricing decision; and the container shipping chain throughput index is negatively correlated with the investment share of the liner company and the congestion cost of the port.更多还原