【摘要】 文章基于审计师强制轮换背景，以2013—2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本，实证分析了年报审计师与公司CEO任期交错现象对审计质量的影响。研究发现：审计师与CEO任期交错能够显著提高审计质量；审计师与CEO任期交错通过增加审计师独立性进而抑制公司盈余操纵；进一步，审计师与经验丰富的CEO任期交错对审计质量的提升更明显，但这种提升效应随着CEO权力增大而逐渐弱化。政府应引导市场参与者合理选聘审计团队，避免任期过度重叠；会计师事务所要平衡独立性与学习效应，提高决策质量；公司须结合CEO任期，配合审计师共同保障审计质量。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the background of mandatory auditor rotation, this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022 as a sample to analyze the impacts of the staggered tenure of auditor and CEO on audit quality. It is found that the stagger of auditor and CEO tenure can significantly improve audit quality. The stagger of auditor and CEO tenure inhibits earnings manipulation by increasing auditor independence; Furthermore, the stagger tenure of auditor and experienced CEO is more obvious to improve audit quality, but this effect is gradually weakened with the increase of CEO power. The government should guide market participants to select audit teams rationally and avoid excessive overlapping of terms of office. Accounting firms should balance independence and learning effect to improve decision-making quality. The company must combine the term of CEO and cooperate with auditors to ensure audit quality.更多还原