【摘要】 合情理性尽管在日常生活中与理性一样被频繁使用，但在学术讨论中，其与理性得到的待遇却完全不同，几乎被完全忽略。罗尔斯、斯坎伦和麦克马洪是少有的赋予合情理性以重要性的作者，但他们的理解主要是对合情理性的形式理解，集中于政治道德领域，从而侧重合情理性的相互性方面。这里提出一种合情理性的新诠释，主要是鉴于对普通人只有有限理性、有限能力和有限利他心的一种后果主义式妥协。在道德领域，有限利他心在有利条件下会形成人道与公平两种基本道德情感，而合情理的人则拥有这两种道德情感，能够分辨相应场合且据之而行动。不仅如此，基于合情理性的这种诠释，可以让我们更恰当地理解现实主义乌托邦，从而成为解决正义的理想理论与非理想理论之争的基石。更多还原

【Abstract】 Although reasonableness is as frequently used as rationality in daily life, it is almost ignored by academics, quite different from rationality. Rawls, Scanlon and McMahon are the only few who attach importance to reasonableness. However, their understandings are primarily formal and focus on the specific domain of morality whose concern is reciprocity. The author will suggest a new interpretation of reasonableness, which mainly results from a type of consequential concession with limited rationality, limited power and limited altruism of ordinary people. In the domain of morality, limited altruism results in two types of moral feelings: beneficence and fairness. The reasonable people have these moral feelings and act upon them on right occasions. Moreover, we could get an adequate understanding of realistic utopia based upon this new interpretation of reasonableness and provide a touchstone to solve the disputes between ideal theory and non-ideal theory of justice.更多还原