【摘要】 本文基于2007年国有资本经营预算制度的准自然实验，利用2003—2010年上市公司A股数据，采用双重差分法对国有资本经营预算制度的政策效果进行评估。结果显示：第一，该预算制度的实施没有有效改善国有控股上市公司2003—2010年这一时期的经营绩效；第二，该预算制度的实施刺激了企业规模扩张；第三，税后利润上缴比例越高，企业过度投资程度越深。本文认为，国有资本经营预算制度的实施使国有控股上市公司的剩余控制权与剩余索取权相分离，激化了委托代理问题，因此只有加强完善国资监管体系，才能提高国有企业的绩效和投资效率。2015—2019年国企净资产收益率基本保持平稳印证了完善监管的必要性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the state-owned capital operation budget system in 2007,this paper uses the data of A-shares of listed companies from 2003to 2010 to evaluate the policy effect of the state-owned capital operation budget system by using the dual difference method. The results show that:1. The implementation of stateowned capital operation budget system does not improve the performance of central enterprises,but worsened their performance;2. The implementation of the state-owned capital operation budget system did not play a role in restraining the excessive investment of enterprises but stimulated their scale expansion;3. The higher the proportion of after-tax profits,the deeper the deterioration of over-investment and operating performance. This paper argues that the principal-agent problem within the state-owned assets supervision system caused by the budget system of state-owned capital operation is one of the main reasons.Therefore,it is not helpful to improve the performance and investment efficiency of stateowned enterprises to simply emphasize the collection of state-owned capital income while ignoring the perfection of the state-owned assets supervision system.更多还原