【摘要】 在乡村振兴战略视野下，对集体林区福建省林权抵押贷款展开实地调研，采用DEM和描述性统计相结合的方法，深入诠释农户林权抵押贷款信贷配给类型和产生机制，进而对信贷配给展开识别与衡量。结果表明：农户因对林权抵押政策认知偏差、禀赋效应、交易费用高昂而面临新的需求型信贷配给；因信息不对称，林地流转市场具有薄市场约束，无法达到银行对林权抵押品的预期价值及抵押物难以有效处置导致信贷风险较高使得农户面临供给型信贷配给；农户林权抵押贷款需求型信贷配给较为严峻。为了实现集体林区福建省现代林业产业振兴，亟须强化制度创新、提高农户金融素养水平、实现多部门数据整合与信用信息共建共享、最大限度释缓集体林区农户需求型信贷配给的路径，以林业金融现代化助推乡村振兴。更多还原

【Abstract】 (1) Background——Under the background of rural revitalization strategy, the research on credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans of the farmers in collective forest areas is not only the internal requirement of promoting the rural revitalization strategy, but also the basic need of realizing the increase of the farmers’ forestry management income in collective forest areas.(2) Methods——The research data came from a questionnaire survey of 420 rural households in Sanyuan District, Jiangle County, Jianning County and Taining County, Sanming City, Fujian Province, in August 2021.Using DEM and descriptive statistics, this paper interpreted the types and generation mechanism of credit rationing of the farmers’ forest rights mortgage loans, and then identified and measured the credit rationing.(3) Results——First, from the perspective of credit rationing of the farmers’ forest rights mortgage loans, the proportion of lack of credit demand for forest rights mortgage loans in collective forest areas in Fujian Province under the background of rural revitalization is relatively high, which is 50.82%.Second, the farmers facing demand-type credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans account for 85.11% of the total credit rationing, while the farmers facing supply-type credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans account for only 14.89% of the total credit rationing.The farmers in collective forest areas are faced with more severe credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans.Third, demand-type credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans mainly includes self-imposed credit rationing, transaction cost credit rationing and risk credit rationing.Fourth, most of the farmers who apply for forest rights mortgage loans from financial institutions can get corresponding loans, but the farmers in collective forest areas can get less amount of forest rights mortgage loans because of the small mortgage area of“Certificate of Forest Rights”.(4) Conclusions and Discussions——First, the farmers generate self-imposed credit rationing because of the cognitive deviation of forest rights mortgage policies, form risk credit rationing because of the endowment effect of the forestlands, and face new transaction cost credit rationing because of high transaction costs.Second, the family management with pure forestry of the small farmers in collective forest areas is still the main type of forestry management in China.However, the degree of part-time employment of the forest farmers in collective forest areas is constantly increasing, there is a phenomenon of forestry management and non-forest employment, and the income comes more from non-forest employment.Third, the proportion of lack of credit demand for forest rights mortgage loans in collective forest areas in Fujian Province under the background of rural revitalization is relatively high.Most of the farmers who have the credit demand for forest rights mortgage loans are still facing more severe demand-type credit rationing.Fourth, the supply-type credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans faced by the farmers is relatively low.Therefore, in order to fully realize the policy effect of forest rights mortgage loans from the perspective of rural revitalization, the following policy suggestions are put forward: First, improve the farmers’ financial literacy through multiple channels.Second, achieve multi-department data integration and credit information co-construction and sharing.Third, strengthen the institutional innovation, alleviate the demand-type credit rationing of forest rights mortgage loans of the farmers in collective forest areas to the maximum extent.更多还原