【摘要】 上市公司会计师事务所变更事件对证券分析师的行为及预测精确度会产生什么样影响，是解读许多上市公司估值超常变更的关键。本文以2010-2019年分析师跟踪人数和私有信息精度数据为研究样本，结合上市公司会计师事务所变更信息，探讨了事务所变更对证券分析师行为的影响。研究结果发现：事务所变更事件会导致分析师减少对公司的跟踪，负向影响公司的市场关注度和估值；而仍保持跟踪的分析师则会加大信息收集和分析力度，增大私有信息精度。进一步的研究还发现，事务所、分析师和公司三个层面的异质性都会对上述关系产生影响：事务所从大所变更为小所的降级变更中，分析师的跟踪数量显著减少，而小所变更为大所的升级变更中，分析师的私有信息精度显著增大；相比明星分析师及来自大券商平台的分析师，非明星分析师和来自小券商平台的分析师呈现出明显的“重升弃降”特征；公司的国有属性和信息披露透明度可以缓解事务所变更带来的负面影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 How analysts interpret the signal of auditor switches, and whether auditor switches would have an impact on analysts’ behavior, are important questions to be answered when studying stock market pricing.The paper used the data of analysts following number and private information precision from 2010 to 2019,combining with the auditor switches information of listed companies, to explore the influence of auditor switches upon analysts’ behavior.The conclusions show that analysts following number decreases when auditor switch happens, resulting in a negative market pricing impact for the company; at the same time, in order to correctly understand the switch event, those keep-on-following analysts will actively collect and interpret private information, resulting in the increase of private information precision.The two facts are not symmetric though: when the switch is from a large auditor to a small one, analysts’ following number decreases the most; while the opposite direction leads to the analysts’ private information precision increasing the most.Moreover, the paper finds the heterogeneities of analysts do exist, and the state-owned attributes or the transparency of a company would alleviate the negative impact of auditor switches.更多还原