【摘要】 本文研究并购交易中的业绩对赌条款对并购后目标公司技术创新和发明者流动的影响，结果发现：相比于未签订对赌条款的目标公司，签订业绩对赌条款的目标公司在被并购后，其创新数量和质量均发生显著的降低，这一效应随着业绩对赌所施加的业绩压力的增加而增加。进一步研究业绩对赌抑制企业创新的作用机制后发现，并购业绩对赌导致目标公司削减研发投入，并致使发明者离职人数增加和新聘人数减少，这些都削弱了企业的创新能力。有别于以往研究普遍强调业绩对赌契约对管理层的激励作用和对业绩的提升作用，本文研究结论有助于进一步认识对赌契约的弊端，从而为并购双方设计更为合理的契约条款提供决策借鉴，也为监管部门通过加强并购市场监管推动企业创新提供有益参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper, we examine the effect of the earnout agreements of acquisitions on innovation productivity and inventor mobility of target firms after the acquisition. We use a difference-in-difference(DID) methodology to establish causality. Our identification strategy suggests a negative causal effect of earnout agreements between acquiring firms and target firms on the post-acquisition innovation output of target firms. This effect is more pronounced among the acquisitions where the earnout agreements exert too much financial pressure on managers. Furthermore, examining the underlying channels through which earnout agreements impede corporate innovation, we show that target firms from the acquisitions with earnout agreements experience a decline in R&D expenses, as well as an increase in the departures of inventors, a decrease in the new hires of inventors during the post-acquisition period. Collectively, different from the prior studies focusing on the incentive effect of earnout agreements, our paper highlights the dark side of the earnout agreements that impede innovation, and provides meaningful policy implications for the companies to design acquisition contracts and for the government to promote innovation through acquisition regulation.更多还原