【摘要】 构建众筹平台、投资者及金融监管机构三方演化博弈模型，探究三者之间的行为演化规律，找寻稳定均衡策略组合，分析其影响因素，为规范我国股权众筹发展提供切实可行的对策建议。研究发现：针对违规行为的处罚越高，众筹平台越倾向于合规经营；投资金额越少，投资者越倾向于参与股权众筹；平台违规行为被媒体曝光的概率越高以及强监管成本越低，金融监管机构越倾向于强监管。为推动三方主体形成“合规经营，参与股权众筹，强监管”稳定均衡策略组合，应对众筹平台实施全过程监管并加大对平台违规行为的处罚，降低参与股权众筹的资金门槛，充分发挥新闻媒体的舆论监督作用，以及完善征信体系，降低强监管成本。更多还原

【Abstract】 This study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving crowdfunding platforms, investors, and financial regulatory institutions. It explores the behavioral evolution among these entities, identifies stable equilibrium strategy combinations, analyzes their influencing factors, and offers feasible policy suggestions to regulate the development of equity crowdfunding in China. The research findings reveal the following tendencies: higher penalties for violations lead crowdfunding platforms toward a more compliant operation; investors are more inclined to participate in equity crowdfunding with smaller investment amounts; as the probability of platform violations being exposed by the media increases and the cost of stringent regulation decreases, financial regulatory institutions lean toward more robust supervision. To encourage a stable equilibrium strategy among the three entities(compliant operation, participation in equity crowdfunding, and strong supervision), measures should involve comprehensive supervision of crowdfunding platforms, stricter penalties for platform violations, reduced financial barriers for participating in equity crowdfunding, leveraging the supervisory role of the news media, enhancing credit systems, and decreasing the costs of strict regulation.更多还原