【摘要】 本文研究了制造商在两种不同定价策略下对公平关切销售商的销售激励合同设计问题。针对两种定价策略：集中定价策略和委托定价策略，基于委托代理理论设计了最优定价和销售激励模型，求解模型得出两种定价策略下制造商对销售商的销售激励合同以及最优定价决策，对公平关切做了敏感性分析并比较两种定价策略的优劣。结果表明，两种定价策略下公平关切都降低了销售商的努力程度和制造商的收益，并且在同一公平关切程度时集中定价策略下的价格、激励系数、销售努力程度和制造商的期望收益都高于委托定价策略的情形，制造商倾向于集中定价，销售商则倾向于委托定价，销售商的公平关切行为对制造商和整个系统是不利的。最后运用算例进一步验证了结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper studies how the rational manufacturer designs the salesforce incentive for fairness-aware sales agent under two different pricing strategies, for which we develop optimal pricing and salesforce incentive models: centralized pricing and delegated pricing settings. The models are further solved and the optimal compensation contracts as well as the pricing are derived, and then the sensitivity analysis of fairness concern are conducted. Extensive comparative studies are conducted to highlight the impacts of the sales agent’s fairness concern on the compensation decisions and on different price strategies. The results show that the fairness behavior prompts the sales agent to exert less sales efforts, and reduces the profits of the manufacturer under the two pricing strategies. The price, incentive coefficient, sales effort and the profit of the manufacturer are higher under the centralized pricing with the same fairness concern, the manufacturer favors centralized pricing over delegated pricing, while the sales agent prefers delegated pricing. The sales agent’s fairness concern is detrimental to the manufacturer and the whole system. All our findings are numerically verified lastly.更多还原