【摘要】 考虑在位制造商开通在线渠道的双渠道供应链，研究了存在潜在市场进入的质量信息披露策略问题。基于博弈论，建立无竞争、线上渠道进入和零售渠道进入的决策模型，得出了相应的最优决策。考虑在位制造商的质量信息披露决策与进入制造商的渠道选择之间的相互作用，分析了产品差异程度对制造商质量信息披露策略及最优利润的影响。结果表明，在位制造商的质量信息披露策略取决于产品相似度和披露成本，当在线(零售)渠道存在竞争时，制造商的信息披露质量意愿降低。最后，分析了产品相似度对进入制造商的最优渠道进入方式的影响，提出了相应的管理建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain where a manufacturer opens the online channel, and investigates quality disclosure strategies with a potential market entry. Based on game theory, three decision models of non-competition, online channel selection and retail channel selection are established, and the optimal solutions are obtained. This paper considers interaction of information disclosure and channel selection strategies, and analyzes the impacts of quality differentiation on the manufacturer’s disclosure strategy and optimal profits. The results show that disclosure strategies of the incumbent manufacturer depend on product similarity and disclosure costs. When there is competition in the online(retail) channel, the manufacturers will be less willing to to disclose quality information. Finally, the influence of product similarity on the optimal entry mode of intruder manufacturers is analyzed, and corresponding management opinions are put forward.更多还原