【摘要】 针对一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链系统，考虑了发生时间具有随机性且伤害产品信任度的危机事件对成员决策的影响，构建了随机产品信任危机预测下的双渠道供应链微分博弈模型。利用Bellman连续动态规划理论分别求得了非合作、成本分担契约、协同合作三种情形下成员的最优策略及利润。研究发现：随机爆发的产品信任危机会改变企业的时间偏好，使企业更加注重当前利润而对赚取未来利润失去耐心；只有当传统渠道(电商渠道)的边际利润较高时，提升传统渠道(电商渠道)的市场份额，才能激励制造商进行更多的品牌建设投入。制造商制定的成本补贴率受到危机前后盈利环境的影响，且只有在一定条件下，成本分担契约才能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改善，而信任危机发生率过高会使改善效果不再明显。更多还原

【Abstract】 Drawing upon a dual-channel supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, and taking account of the fact that crisis event may happen at any time and its trust-impairing outcome may affect chain members’ decision-making, this paper constructs a differential game model of two-channel supply chain based on stochastic product trust crisis prediction. Based on Bellman continuous dynamic programming theory, the optimal strategies and profits of members are obtained under the conditions of non-cooperative, cost-sharing contract and cooperative cooperation, respectively. It is found that the random outbreak of product trust crisis will change the time preference of enterprises, resulting in them paying more attention to current profits and losing patience for future profits. Only when the marginal profit of the traditional channel(e-commerce channel) is high, can the manufacturer be encouraged to invest more in brand building by increasing the market share of the traditional channel(e-commerce channel). The cost subsidy rate set by the manufacturer is affected by the profit environment before and after the crisis, and only under certain conditions, can the cost-sharing contract realize the Pareto improvement of the profits of supply chain members, but if trust crisis occurs too frequently, such improvement will decline.更多还原