【摘要】 公务员的避责行为在一定程度上会掣肘政府治理绩效的提升，厘清其生成逻辑方能从根源上找出破解之道。基于场域理论构建“场域—感知—行为”的整体性分析框架，利用A省领导及下属公务员匹配调查数据，探究地方公务员在中国语境下避责行为的生成机制。研究发现：与个体的惯习因素相比，所处行政环境的规则张力和资本约束对地方公务员避责行为的生成发挥着更关键的作用，控制风险感知变量后的资本约束更容易催生其避责行为的产生。由此可知，地方公务员避责行为的生成逻辑主要表现是“主动为”的压力型逻辑和“不得不为”的约束型逻辑，这两种逻辑对不同职务类别、服务对象的公务员避责行为的影响也显著不同。研究为厘清公务员避责行为的生成机制提供了新的实践支持，也为现阶段破除避责困境提供了启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 The blame avoidance behaviors of civil servants can hamper the improvement of government performance, and the solution can only be found at the root by clarifying its generation logic. The study,based on the Field Theory, developed a holistic analysis framework of "field-perception-behavior" to investigate the mechanism of blame avoidance behavior of local civil servants in the Chinese context by using the data from the matching survey of leaders and subordinate civil servants in Province A. The study finds that, compared with individual habitual factors, the avoidance behavior of local civil servants was more influenced by the administrative environment than by their individual habits. The study also finds that,compared with individual habitual factors, rule tensions and capital constraints in the administrative environment play a more critical role in the generation of local civil servants’ blame avoidance behaviors,and that capital constraints after the controlling risk perceives variables are more likely to generate their blame avoidance behaviors. It can thus be seen that the generation logic of local civil servants’ avoidance behavior is mainly manifested by the pressure logic of "actively doing" and the constraint logic of "having to do", and that the influences of these two logics on the avoidance behavior of civil servants in different job categories and service recipients are also significantly different. The study provides new practical support for clarifying the generation mechanism of civil servants’ blame avoidance behavior, and also provides insights for solving the blame avoidance dilemma at this stage.更多还原