【摘要】 基于碳达峰和碳中和背景下中国物流企业的低碳义务履行问题，构建了政府、物流企业和公众三方演化博弈模型，以研究政府、物流企业和公众在低碳行为信用监管进程中相互作用的演化过程。同时运用Netlogo软件进行了参数仿真实验，寻找提升监管效果的最优政策。研究结论如下：(1)地方政府和公众两种力度的综合影响能够有效地改变企业的策略选择，促进企业的低碳行为；(2)在提升监管效果方面，降低政府监管成本的效果十分显著，降低公众成本的效果会适得其反；(3)提高政府对企业的补贴和政府对企业的罚款都有显著提升效果且提高前者的效果更好。然而提升上级政府对地方政府的处罚会降低系统的稳定性；(4)通过增大公众对企业的收益影响而不是增大政府对公众的补贴更能促进监管的效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the low-carbon obligation fulfillment of Chinese logistics enterprises, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary process of the interaction between the local government, logistics enterprises and the public in the process of low-carbon behavior credit supervision. Then using Netlogo software, a parameter simulation experiment is conducted to determine the optimal policy for improving the effect of supervision. The results are as follows:(1) The combined influence of the local government and the public can effectively change the strategic choice of enterprises and promote the low-carbon behavior of enterprises.(2) In terms of improving the effect of supervision, reducing the cost of government supervision would have a highly significant effect, and reducing the cost of the public would be counterproductive.(3) Increasing the government subsidies to enterprises and the government’s fines to enterprises both have a significant effect, and the effect of improving the former is better. However, increasing the severity of higher-level governments punishing local governments will reduce the stability of the system.(4) Supervision can be more effective by increasing the public’s impact on enterprises’ earnings rather than by increasing government subsidies to the public.更多还原