【摘要】 在体验品市场上，即便是市场声誉很高的企业也会欺骗消费者，这种声誉激励机制失灵问题是我国产品质量安全责任事故频发的重要原因。本文运用不完美监督重复博弈模型，主要研究了这一问题在不完美监督条件下体验品市场上的表现，并结合产品责任制给出了可能的解决方案。本文的研究发现，仅凭声誉机制无法解决不完美监督下体验品市场上的产品质量安全问题，存在着市场失灵，而引入产品责任制与声誉机制相结合有助于解决这一问题。然而，引入严格责任原则还是过错责任原则，则取决于法院判决的专业化水平。当法院判决的专业化水平较高时，相对于严格责任原则，过错责任原则与声誉机制相结合可以达到社会最优状态；反之，则严格责任原则具有更大的可行性价值。据此，本文认为，提高法院判决的专业化水平，减少产品质量责任标准的不确定性，降低甄别产品侵权责任的专家系统的成本，可以有效改善声誉机制运行的法律基础，帮助改进和优化社会福利。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the experience product market, even the enterprises with high market reputation will cheat consumers. The failure of reputation incentive mechanism is an important reason for the frequent occurrence of product quality and safety liability accidents in China. In this paper, we use the repeated game model of imperfect supervision to study the performance of this problem in the physical inspection market under the condition of imperfect supervision, and give the possible solutions combined with the product responsibility system. The repeated games moral hazard model constructed in this paper shows that reputation mechanism alone cannot solve the product quality and safety problems in the experience product market under imperfect monitor, there is market failure; and the introduction of product liability together with reputation mechanism can help solve this problem. However, the introduction of strict liability or negligence rule depends on courts’ professional level. When the courts’ professional level is relatively high, negligence rule together with the reputation mechanism can achieve the social optimal(second best)state; on the contrary,strict liability has greater feasibility value. Based on this, this paper believes that improving courts’ professional level, reducing the uncertainty of product quality liability standards, and reducing the cost of expert systems for screening product infringement liability can effectively improve the legal basis of reputation mechanism and help achieve social welfare optimization.更多还原