【摘要】 业绩补偿承诺作为一项保护投资者权益的创新金融工具，其能否实现既定的目标十分重要。本文利用2013-2017年上半年间完成的重大资产重组事件为样本，发现该承诺中涉及的不同关键对赌条款设计会带来显著差异的业绩实现情况，且与以往的研究相比存在些许不同。承诺增长率越高、承诺期限越长，业绩实现情况越差，而现金补偿、补对价以及分期补偿却能正向影响业绩实现。此外，仅设置超额奖励机制并不能真正起到激励作用，关键还要看奖励机制中的奖励额度与额外要求。最后，本文又进行了异质性分析，考察不同公司治理水平下，具体设置对业绩实现情况的影响，为进一步理解该估值调整机制提供了一个新思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an innovative financial tool that protects the rights and interests of investors, the performance compensation commitment is very important whether it can achieve the established goals. This article uses the mergers and acquisitions completed during 2013-2017 and a half as samples, and finds that the different settings of gambling terms involved in the commitment will bring significant differences in performance. And there are some differences with previous studies. The higher the promised growth rate and the longer the promised period, the worse the performance is achieved. However, cash compensation, supplementary consideration, and installment compensation can positively affect the achievement of performance. In addition, whether the excess reward mechanism is set up or not does not play an incentive role. The key lies in the reward quota and additional requirements in the reward mechanism. Finally, this paper conducts a heterogeneous analysis, trying to distinguish the impact of specific settings on achievement of performance under different corporate governance levels, and provide a new idea for further understanding of the valuation adjustment mechanism.更多还原