【摘要】 第一次鸦片战争后，中国的关税制度沦为片面的协定税则制，虽然清政府和北洋政府都致力于收回关税主权，但终以失败告终。纵观目前已有民国时期关税自主的著作与文章，大多立足于纯历史学范畴，而鲜有完整的从经济学视角进行的研究。运用制度经济学中的利益集团理论，解析近代中国关税自主政策演进的过程。通过剖析“中央政府”、民族资产阶级和列强3个利益集团的力量、态度和策略选择，揭示其在关税自主政策变迁中所发挥的重要作用，即北洋政府和南京国民政府始终是关税自主政策的主导者，民族资产阶级利益集团起着促进和延缓关税自主的“双重”作用，列强利益集团则由抵制反对关税自主转变为妥协让步。更多还原

【Abstract】 After the First Opium War,Chinas tariff system degenerated into a one-sided agreement tariff system,and although both the Qing and Beiyang governments were committed to recovering tariff sovereignty,they ultimately failed.Throughout the existing works and articles on tariff autonomy in the Republic of China period,most of them are based on pure history,and few are completely studied from the perspective of economics.Using the interest group theory in institutional economics,we analyze the process of the evolution of Chinas tariff autonomy policy in modern times.Through the analysis of the strength,attitude and strategic choices of the three interest groups of the“central government”,the national bourgeoisie and the great powers,it is revealed that they have played an important role in the change of tariff autonomy policy,that is,the Beiyang Government and the Nanjing National Government have always been the leaders of the tariff autonomy policy,the national bourgeois interest groups have played a“dual”role in promoting and delaying tariff autonomy,and the interest groups of the great powers have changed from resisting and opposing tariff autonomy to making compromises and concessions.更多还原