【摘要】 SNOW3G是由ETSI/SAGE于2006年基于SNOW2.0设计的流密码算法,已被3GPP采纳为国际加密标准,并在4G/5G移动通信中作为数据机密性算法和数据完整性算法的核心算法使用.已有大量研究工作证明了SNOW3G算法足以抵御传统的密码分析攻击,但很少有工作对该算法的具体实现进行分析,验证算法抵抗侧信道攻击的能力.本文以3GPP标准中SNOW3G的算法实现为研究对象,从侧信道的角度出发在单片机上研究该算法的安全性,提出了针对该算法的相关性能量攻击方法.首先,对SNOW3G的算法实现进行分析,找到算法中存在能量泄漏的操作,然后根据算法中密钥与该操作间的联系制定合理的攻击策略,最终恢复出算法的密钥.通过实验对提出的相关性能量攻击方法进行了验证,结果表明,在装有ATMega128A芯片的单片机上,利用该方法仅需使用2000条能量消耗曲线即可在1小时内完整恢复出算法的密钥.更多还原

【Abstract】 SNOW3G was designed by ETSI/SAGE in 2006 based on SNOW2.0. It has been adopted by 3GPP as an international encryption standard and is the core algorithm for confidentiality and integrity in 4G/5G communication standards. It has been proved that SNOW3G has sufficient resistance against traditional cryptanalysis. However, there is little work to verify whether SNOW3G could resist against side channel attack. This paper studies the security of SNOW3G by the implementation of SNOW3G on the microcontroller using side channel methods. A strategy of correlation power attack against SNOW3G is also proposed. By analyzing the implementation of SNOW3G, the operations that leak information of power consumption can be found. With these operations, a reasonable strategy is developed to obtain the key of SNOW3G. At the end of this paper, the effectiveness of this proposed strategy is demonstrated via experiments. Experiments show that, On the MCU equipped with ATMega128A chip, the key can be recovered completely by taking 2000 traces and 1 hour operation.更多还原