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基于博弈论的物流企业排污监管制度设计

Design of Enterprise Pollution Supervision System Based on Game Behavior Analysis

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【作者】 张恒康吴继忠

【Author】 ZHANG Hengkang;WU Jizhong;School of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology;

【机构】 上海理工大学管理学院

【摘要】 我国为治理污染物排放,采取了一系列措施,例如控制污染物的排放量,监管企业的排污行为等。针对物流企业排污行为选择的动机以及监管部门采取监管行为的时机,采用混合博弈模型,证明监管制度的必要性,并结合行为管理中的孙氏图,通过Matlab仿真分析关键制度参数对监管制度设计的影响,调整关键参数以达到限制物流企业违法排污行为的目的,为监管部门提出合理化建议以供参考。

【Abstract】 In order to control pollutant emission, China has taken a series of measures, such as controlling pollutant emission, supervising enterprise pollutant discharge behavior and so on. In view of the motivation for the selection of pollution discharge behavior of logistics enterprises and the opportunity for regulatory authorities to adopt regulatory behavior, the mixed game model is adopted to prove the necessity of regulatory system. Combined with the sun diagram in behavior management, the influence of key system parameters on the design of regulatory system is analyzed through Matlab simulation, and the key parameters are adjusted to limit the illegal pollution discharge behavior of logistics enterprises, provide suggestions to the regulatory authorities for reference.

  • 【文献出处】 物流科技 ,Logistics Sci-Tech , 编辑部邮箱 ,2022年06期
  • 【分类号】F259.23;X322
  • 【下载频次】74
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