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药企合谋对药品招标采购的影响——以药品集中带量采购为例
Effects of Collusion on Drug Procurement Auctions——Evidence from the National Centralized Drug Procurement Policy in China
【摘要】 本文首先构建了动态招采模型,分析集中带量采购对投标过程中药企合谋行为的影响。模型预期,带量采购通过采购所占份额提高企业背离合谋的可能性,并降低合谋内的价格;带量采购会通过减少未来企业数量提高未来招标价格。我们通过案例分析现实中招采合谋的特点,并使用招标数据度量了政策影响。实证结果支持模型预期:政策使得药物价格平均下降86.6%;药品市场集中度越高,政策降价效果越小;各类药品招标频率越高,政策降价效果越小。
【Abstract】 We evaluate the effects of China’s National Centralized Drug Procurement Policy(NCDPP) on drug procurement results. We construct a dynamic procurement model to study bidders’ collusion behavior. The model shows that: increasing procurement amounts or reducing procurement frequency incentivizes bidders to deviate from collusion, which causes lower bidding prices; the changes also reduce the number of bidders, which raises the future price. Then, we use the drug procurement data to examine the theoretical predictions. The results show that the NCDPP decreased the drug price by 87% on average; a high market concentration caused lower prices in the drug procurement.
【Key words】 collusion; procurement auctions; national centralized drug procurement policy;
- 【文献出处】 经济学(季刊) ,China Economic Quarterly , 编辑部邮箱 ,2022年06期
- 【分类号】R95;F426.72
- 【下载频次】212