【摘要】 防范和化解金融风险，引导企业“脱虚向实”,促进实体经济高质量发展是当前中国金融改革的重要目标。本文以2009—2020年289个地级市上市实体企业为研究样本，结合“烙印理论”,研究了官员金融经历对所辖区企业金融化的具体效应及其作用机理。研究发现，官员金融经历对其所辖区企业金融化有显著的负向影响，表现为“治理效应”,经过一系列稳健性测试后依然具有可靠性。进一步分析表明，官员金融经历会引导所辖区企业抑制投机性金融资产，提升实体资本投资来降低企业金融化。作用路径分析发现，缓解融资约束是降低所辖区企业金融化的主要路径。异质性研究发现，当地区巡视监督未覆盖、企业产权性质为国有企业时，官员金融经历对企业金融化影响显著为负。此外，相比较于市委书记金融经历，市长金融经历对所辖区企业金融化影响更为相关。本文为金融干部队伍建设提供理论解释与经验证据支持，也为有效预防“脱实向虚”行为进行金融监管提供微观层面证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 To prevent and defuse financial risks, guide enterprises to decrease financialization, and promote high-quality development of the real economy are important goals of China’s current financial reform.Using listed firms located in 289 prefecture-level cities from 2009 to 2020 as research samples, we study the effects of government officials’ financial background on the financialization of enterprises in their jurisdictions as well as mechanisms in it based on “imprinting theory”.We find that the financial background of officials has a significant negative impact on the financialization of enterprises in their jurisdictions, behaving as a “governance effect”,and this conclusion is reliable after a series of robustness tests.Further analysis shows that officials’ financial experience could motivate enterprises in their jurisdictions to suppress speculative financial investment and increase real capital investment so as to reduce corporate financialization.Further, mechanism analysis shows that alleviating financing constraints is the main path to reduce the financialization of enterprises.Besides, heterogeneity tests show that the effects of officials’ financial experience on financialization are more pronounced when the enterprises do not receive regional inspection supervision and they are state-owned enterprises.In addition, compared with the Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, the financial experience of the Mayor is more relevant to enterprises financialization under his jurisdiction.This paper provides theoretical explanations and empirical evidence for the construction of financial cadres, and also provides micro-level evidence for preventing enterprises’ financialization effectively.The contributions of this paper include: first, it provides new evidence on whether cadres with financial experience can effectively prevent and control financial risks.Currently, in view of the promotion of senior leaders with financial experience in China, this paper finds that the financial experience of officials significantly reduces financialization of enterprises in their jurisdictions, and examines heterogeneous effects in different scenarios, so as to provide experience for the construction of financial cadres as well as provide decision support for promoting effective governance of corporate financialization through the coordination and unification of “promising government” and “effective market”.Second, extant research mainly explores the factors of corporate financialization from perspectives of macro, industry or executive characteristics.However, these studies cannot explain why the degree of corporate financialization in different regions varies greatly under a homogeneous macro policy environment.To fill up this gap, this paper systematically studies the influence and mechanism of officials’ financial experience on financialization of enterprises in their jurisdiction by the micro-level officials’ characteristics.This paper provides empirical evidence for whether cadres with financial experience can effectively prevent and control financial risks, and also confirms that officials’ financial experience can inhibit over-financialization of enterprises in their jurisdictions and prevent systemic financial risks from spreading to the micro level(especially real enterprises) as well.Also, this paper verifies that the initiative “building a team of high-quality financial talents with both political integrity and ability to strengthen financial supervision” is forward-looking and scientific.Based on above, the policy implications of this paper are as follows: first, currently, when vigorously selecting financial cadres to consolidate local regulatory responsibilities, it is also necessary to make full use of professional endowments, resource advantages and management advantages of officials with financial experience to promote adjustment and upgrading of regional industries and motivate development of the real economy.Second, the financial experience of officials can effectively reduce the financialization of enterprises in their jurisdictions.In the future, it is necessary to guide enterprises to allocate financial assets effectively, alleviate the short-sightedness of managers’ pursuit of profit, reduce overall business risk expectations, and promote the return to main business operations.Third, the financial experience of officials has more significant governance effects on state-owned enterprises and companies without regional inspections.So the promotion of financial cadres is conducive to deepening reforms in China’s financial sector and it is also an effective measure to strengthen financial supervision.Therefore, it is necessary to formulate targeted regulations for regions and enterprises with different property rights to lead financial services return to the real economy and promote healthy development of capital market according to local conditions.Fourth, in selecting and appointment of financial cadres, it is important to implement new development concepts thoroughly, focus on the real economy, affirm positive roles of officials’ financial experience in financial reforms and innovation objectively, and avoid excessive intervention in financial system in the meantime.更多还原