【摘要】 基于管理谋私与信息披露的双重视角，以2014—2018年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，利用固定效应模型实证研究董事长-CEO校友关系这一非正式制度对公司股价崩盘风险的影响，并考察了董事会监督、会计稳健性和媒体报道对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现：董事长-CEO校友关系会加剧公司股价崩盘风险，表明董事长-CEO校友关系在公司的经营管理和信息披露决策中起到了“裙带效应”的作用；当公司董事会监督较弱、会计稳健性较低、媒体报道较多时，董事长-CEO校友关系对公司股价崩盘风险的“裙带效应”更显著。进一步研究表明，当公司董事长和CEO均毕业于高水平院校或所处地区市场化程度较高时，董事长-CEO校友关系对公司股价崩盘风险的加剧作用更显著。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the dual perspectives of management self-interests and information disclosure, taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2018 as samples, by using fixed-effect model, this paper empirically studies the impact of the informal chairman-CEO alumni relation on the stock price crash risk, and examines moderating effects of the board monitoring, accounting conservatism and media coverage on relationship between the two. The results show that: the chairman-CEO alumni relation aggravates the company’s stock price crash risk, indicating that it plays a “nepotism effect” in the company’s management and information disclosure. When a company’s board monitoring is weaker, accounting conservatism is lower, and media coverage is more, the “nepotism effect” of the chairman-CEO alumni relation on the stock price crash risk is more significant. Further research shows that when both the chairman and the CEO graduate from high-level institutions or the company’s region is more market-oriented, the chairman-CEO alumni relation plays a more significant role in exacerbating the stock price crash risk.更多还原