【摘要】 本文根据2012—2019年城商行数据,研究了民营股东对城商行公司治理有效性的影响,发现民资持股能够降低城商行受到的行政处罚,提升城商行公司治理有效性。考虑地方政府的影响后这种效应仍然存在;且在地方政府持股总和最大的分组中这种效应更为显著。而民营大股东和本地民营股东降低行政处罚效果更为显著。另外,民营股东与城商行内部和外部治理机制之间存在替代关系,即内部和外部治理机制较弱的城商行,民营股东能够更加显著降低行政处罚。本文的研究为城商行股权改革提升公司治理有效性提供了新的证据,同时丰富了混合所有制改革在银行领域的实践经验。更多还原

【Abstract】 We investigate how POE which hold the share of City Commercial Bank(CCB) may influence the effectiveness of corporate governance of CCB,based on 2012-2019 annual data.It is found that POE shareholding can reduce the administrative punishment imposed on CCB and improve the effectiveness of corporate governance.This effect still exists after considering the influence of local government, and the effect is more significant in the bank which is controled by local government.Also, local POEs’ and POEs who holding more than 5% reduce administrative punishment effect is more pronounced.In addition, there is a substitution relationship between the POE shareholding and the internal and external governance mechanism of CCB.In other words, if the internal and external governance mechanism is weaker, the POE shareholding can reduce the administrative punishment more significantly.This paper provides new evidences for the ownership reform of CCB can improve the effectiveness of corporate governance and enriches the practical experience of mixed ownership reform in the field of bank.更多还原