【摘要】 研发支出资本化机制的本意是方便企业传递研发活动未来可能成功的信号,但部分企业利用其进行盈余管理,使投资者产生质疑。本文提出可采用超基准动机方法来识别其中的盈余管理者。对A股公司2013―2019年的样本数据研究发现,非可疑公司的研发支出资本化率与研发强度正相关,而可疑公司则无关。进一步的Ohlson模型显示,市场对总体样本的研发支出资本化的定价为中性,但将可疑样本和非可疑样本分开后,市场对盈余管理者的研发支出资本化的定价为负,且超基准盈余管理动机越高,市场定价越低;而对信号释放者的研发支出资本化的定价为正。该方法相对其他分类方法的区分度更高。本文为区分研发支出资本化的信号释放者与盈余管理者提供了一个新思路,有利于研发支出资本化政策的落实和推进。更多还原

【Abstract】 The original intention of R&D capitalization is to convey a possible future economic benefits signal of R&D investment,but some listed companies use it for earnings management, which makes investors suspicious of it. This paper identifies the companies with earnings management by using the method of benchmark beating motivations. Based on the sample of listed companies from 2013 to 2019, it is found that R&D capitalization rate is positively correlated with the R&D intensity for the non-suspicious companies, but it is not the case for the suspicious companies. Furthermore, the results of the Ohlson model show the market price the R&D capitalization is neutral for the sample companies. However, the market positively prices the R&D capitalization of signalers and negatively prices the R&D capitalization of “earnings managers” after a separation of the sample.It is also found that when the motivation of the earnings management is higher, the market evaluation will be lower. This paper provides an effective method to identify earnings managers from signalers in R&D capitalization and, therefore, is constructive to the enforcement and promotion of the capitalization policy.更多还原