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高科技企业与知识型员工劳资之间的薪酬博弈模型

Salary Game Model between High-Tech Enterprises and Knowledge Workers

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【作者】 刘国山刁海璨

【Author】 LIU Guo-shan;DIAO Hai-can;Business School, Renmin University of China;

【机构】 中国人民大学商学院

【摘要】 近年来,一些高科技企业的知识型员工过劳、猝死和自杀事件层出不穷,学者们从工作压力等不同角度对此现象进行了探讨。本文引入不完全信息动态博弈模型,从工资水平和工作压力强度两个方面建立了科技企业和知识型员工的劳资双方多阶段动态薪酬博弈模型,并基于理论推演给出科技企业和知识型员工的博弈效益虚拟数值,进而得到模型的"高薪高工作强度"均衡解。文章揭示了当前高科技企业及其员工倾向于高薪高强度模式的内在机理,也解释了知识型员工采取极端行为的原因,为探究有效平衡经济利益和社会责任的雇佣关系新模式提供借鉴。

【Abstract】 In recent years, overwork, sudden deaths, and suicides of knowledge workers in some high-tech companies have emerged continuously. Scholars have explored this phenomenon from different angles such as work pressure. This paper introduces a dynamic game model with incomplete information to establish a multi-stage dynamic salary game model for high-tech enterprises and knowledge workers in terms of wage level and work pressure intensity. Based on theoretical deduction, the virtual value of the game benefits of technology companies and knowledge workers is given, and then the equilibrium solution of the model’s “high salary and high work intensity” is obtained. The article reveals the internal mechanism of current high-tech companies and their employees’ tendency to high-pay and high-intensity models, and also explains why knowledge workers take extreme actions. The research provides a reference for exploring new models of employment relationships that effectively balance economic benefits and social responsibilities.

  • 【文献出处】 运筹与管理 ,Operations Research and Management Science , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年10期
  • 【分类号】F272.92;F276.44
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】1295
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