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双渠道供应链企业回收策略演化与协调

Evolution and coordination of enterprise recycling strategies in dual-channel supply chain

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【作者】 康凯赵宇杰张敬

【Author】 Kang Kai;Zhao Yujie;Zhang Jing;School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology;School of Economics and Management, Beihang University;

【机构】 河北工业大学经济管理学院北京航空航天大学经济管理学院

【摘要】 考虑政府在市场与企业的双向介入与消费者驱动,建立制造商与零售商三种回收策略组合供应链决策模型,应用Stackelberg博弈进行求解,并基于非对称演化博弈论对三种决策模型进行分析,得出回收演化稳定策略.最后基于改进的二部收费契约对供应链进行协调.结果表明,制造商与零售商同时进行回收是供应链系统的演化稳定策略,协调契约可进一步提升演化稳定策略下供应链企业的利润和回收量;政府介入偏向和消费者敏感度影响供应链企业利润及回收量,当消费者对双渠道的回收价格敏感度相差较大时,政府可通过提高回收奖惩或降低回收补贴使演化稳定策略下的供应链企业利润优于其它回收策略.

【Abstract】 Considering the government’s two-way interventions and consumer’s driving force, this research establishes three supply chain decision models with different combinations of recycling strategies, which are solved by Stackelberg game. Recycling evolutionary stable strategy(ESS) is obtained though the analysis of the three modles based on asymmetric evolutionary game theory. Finally, the supply chain is coordinated based on the improved two-part tariff contract. The results indicate that: the simultaneous recycling strategy of the manufacturer and the retailer is the ESS of the supply chain system; the coordination contract can further enhance both the profits and the recycling of supply chain enterprises under ESS; the government intervention bias and consumer sensitivity can affect the profit and recycling of supply chain enterprises; when there are greater differences in consumers’ sensitivities to the two-channel recycling price, the government can make the supply chain enterprises’ profits higher under ESS than under other recovery strategies by increasing recycling incentives, or penalties, or reducing recycling subsidies.

【基金】 国家社会科学基金资助项目(14BGL055; 18BGL012);河北省研究生创新资助项目(CXZZSS2019033)
  • 【文献出处】 系统工程学报 ,Journal of Systems Engineering , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年06期
  • 【分类号】F274;F713.2
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】653
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