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基于合同控制权柔性的城市轨道交通项目参与方演化博弈研究
Research on Incentive Mechanism of Urban Rail Transit Participants Based on Control-Right Flexibility
【摘要】 为加快城市轨道交通项目建设速度,有效缓解业主、承包商和监理单位面临的不确定性风险压力,改善参与方合作关系,引入合同控制权柔性,应用演化博弈理论构建业主、承包商和监理单位三方演化博弈模型,分析其演化路径,对损益参数进行仿真。结果表明,业主注入合同控制权柔性强度、损失值、各方投入成本及罚款成本都将影响参与方合作关系的演化,并在促进参与方顺利合作方面起到重要作用。为改善城市轨道交通项目参与方之间的合作关系,提出在合同控制权柔性强度的适度范围内提升惩罚成本、加强参与主体风险损失预估能力、合理控制成本支出等相关对策建议。
【Abstract】 To accelerate the constructionof urban rail transit projects, relieve the uncertainty risk faced by the owner, the contractor and the supervisor, and improve the relations among participants, this paper introduced control-right flexibility to build an evolutionary game model of the three participants. In addition, itanalyzed the evolutionary path and simulated the gain and loss parameters. The results demonstrate that the owner’s control-right flexibility in the contract, the loss value, and the input cost and penalty cost of all parties will affect the evolution of their partnerships and play an important role in promoting the smooth cooperation among the participants. For the better relations among the participants in urban rail transit projects, relevant countermeasures and suggestions were proposed, such as raising the penalty cost within the appropriate range of the control-right flexibility, strengthening the risk loss estimation ability of the participants, and reasonably controlling cost.
【Key words】 Urban Rail Transit; Control-Right Flexibility; Evolutionary Game; Incentive Mechanism; Uncertainty Risk;
- 【文献出处】 铁道运输与经济 ,Railway Transport and Economy , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年08期
- 【分类号】F572;F224.32
- 【被引频次】1
- 【下载频次】256