【摘要】 基层减负进程中"问责悖论"的出现成为基层治理的痛点,严重掣肘了新时代经济社会的高质量发展与基层治理效能。宏观上,基层政府面临着全面问责体制下政策执行效果不确定性所带来的问责风险压力;微观上,基层政府官员面临着剩余索取权的紧缩,导致了官员政策执行不出事的避责形式主义执行。这种"问责—避责"的双重逻辑使得基层政府及官员在"干事"与"避责"之间来回钟摆。克服基层减负进程中的"问责悖论"核心在于激励机制的设置,政府如何设置合理的激励机制以实现对基层的有效监督但又不会消减问责绩效,这是政府组织治理的难题。通过构建"剩余权"与"控制权"互嵌的分析框架,探究了不同层级、部门间在控制权四个维度,即信息决策权、目标设定权、检查验收权、激励分配权中剩余控制权与剩余索取权错配下的避责形式主义执行。更多还原

【Abstract】 The appearance of "accountability paradox" in the process of reducing burdens on community-level government has become a pain point of community—level governance,which has seriously hampered the high-quality development of economy and society in the new era and the efficiency of community-level governance.At the macro level,the community-level government is facing the accountability risk pressure brought by the uncertainty of policy implementation effect under the comprehensive accountability system;at the micro level,community-level officials are facing the contraction of residual claims,which leads to the blame avoidance in policy implementation.This dual logic of "accountability-blame avoidance" makes the community-level government and officials swing back and forth between "accomplishment" and "blame avoidance".The core of overcoming the "accountability paradox" in the process of reducing burdens on community-level government lies in the establishment of incentive mechanism.How to set up a reasonable incentive mechanism for the government to effectively supervise the community-level government without reducing accountability performance is a difficult problem in government organizational governance.By constructing an analytical framework of interemebeded "residual right" and "control right",this paper explores the blame avoidance of the four dimensions of control right at different levels and departments,namely,information decision-making right,target setting right,inspection and acceptance right,and incentive distribution right under the mismatch between residual control right and residual claim right.更多还原