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产权性质对企业股份回购的影响研究
Influences of Property Nature upon Corporate Share Buybacks
【摘要】 股份回购是西方上市公司回报投资者的重要手段。与西方相比,由于受到法律制度的限制,长期以来中国上市公司股份回购不够活跃。基于《公司法》修订之后的数据研究发现,相较于非国有企业,国有企业更不倾向于进行股份回购。机制检验的结果显示,吸纳更多就业、更不偏好回报投资者是国有企业股份回购倾向较低的重要原因。进一步研究发现,不同类型国有企业的样本回购行为也存在差异,CEO任期越长、CEO拥有政府背景时更不倾向于进行回购股份;国有企业政治级别越高、实际控制人间接控股时,越倾向于股份回购。上述结论既丰富了中国制度背景下的股份回购理论,也对资本市场监管有一定的政策参考价值。
【Abstract】 Share repurchase is an important means for western listed companies to repay investors. Restricted by the legal system, share repurchase of Chinese listed companies has not been active enough for a long time. In October 2018,the National People’s Congress made a special amendment to the company law, giving listed companies greater autonomy in share repurchase, providing a good opportunity to study the motivation of share repurchase of listed companies. Different from the western capital market, there are a large number of state-owned enterprises in China’s capital market, and the phenomenon of one share dominating is very common. Is there any difference between the share repurchase of stateowned enterprises and private enterprises? What are the reasons for the differences? There is no literature to test how the nature of property rights affects the behavior of share repurchase. Based on the data after the revision of the company law, this paper finds that compared with non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises are less inclined to carry out share repurchase. The results of mechanism test show that absorbing more employment and less preference for return investors are the reasons for the lower tendency of share repurchase of state-owned enterprises. Further research shows that different types of state-owned enterprises have different repurchase behaviors. The longer the CEO’s tenure and the CEO’s government background, the less likely they are to repurchase shares; the higher the political level of state-owned enterprises and the actual controller’s control, the more likely they are to repurchase shares. The conclusion of this paper not only enriches the theory of share repurchase under the background of China’s system, but also has some policy implications for the supervision of the capital market.
【Key words】 share repurchase; nature of property right; Principal-Agent Theory;
- 【文献出处】 南通大学学报(社会科学版) ,Journal of Nantong University(Social Sciences Edition) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年03期
- 【分类号】F832.51
- 【被引频次】5
- 【下载频次】560