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“混改”国企高管薪酬差距与研发投入关系研究——基于管理层权力视角
Research on the Relationship between the Compensation Gap of Senior Executives in State-owned Enterprises and R&D Investment Based on the Perspective of Management Power
【摘要】 以2015-2019年推行"混改"的国企为样本,基于锦标赛理论、管理层权力理论,探究"混改"国企高管薪酬差距与企业研发投入之间的关系。结果表明,"混改"国企高管薪酬差距与企业研发投入存在正相关关系。此外,进一步验证了管理层权力因素是否会影响二者关系,在对管理层权力三个单一维度二职合一、股权分散度和CEO长期在任分组检验的结果中发现:二职合一与CEO长期在任负向调节了"混改"国企高管薪酬差距与研发投入的正向关系,而股权分散度越高,"混改"国企高管薪酬差距与研发投入关系越强。
【Abstract】 Based on the tournament theory and management power theory, this paper explores the relationship between executive compensation gap and enterprise R&D investment in state-owned enterprises that have implemented "mixed reform" during 2014-2019.The results show that there is a positive correlation between the compensation gap of state-owned enterprises executives and their r&dinvestment. In addition, further verify the management of power factor will affect the relationship between the two, three single dimension on the right of management the joining together of two jobs, equity dispersion and CEO long-serving grouping test results found that: the joining together of two jobs and CEO long-serving negative regulating the "mix" state-owned enterprises executive pay gap and positive relationship between r&d input, and the higher the equity dispersion, change "mix" state-owned enterprises executive pay gap between the stronger relationship with r&d.
【Key words】 executive pay gap; R&dinput; Managementpower; "Mixing" state-owned enterprises;
- 【文献出处】 沈阳工程学院学报(社会科学版) ,Journal of Shenyang Institute of Engineering(Social Science) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年01期
- 【分类号】F273.1;F276.1;F272.92
- 【被引频次】5
- 【下载频次】384