【摘要】 非控股大股东能否以及如何发挥治理作用一直是学术研究的重点。本文选取2007-2017年中国A股上市公司作为研究样本,探讨多个大股东是否会通过选择高质量的审计服务来解决与控股股东之间的代理问题。研究发现,存在多个大股东的上市公司更倾向于选聘国际四大会计师事务所、提供更高的审计费用以获得高质量的审计服务。进一步研究表明,在公司治理水平低和年报文本可读性低时,多个大股东对高质量审计服务的需求更强烈。从经济后果来看,多个大股东与高质量审计可以发挥监督合力从而提升企业价值。此外,存在多个大股东的上市公司更可能进行自愿性内部控制审计。本文的研究结果表明,选择高质量的审计服务是非控股大股东发挥公司治理作用的重要手段。更多还原

【Abstract】 Whether and how non-controlling large shareholders can play a governance role has always been the focus of academic research. In this paper, we explore whether multiple large shareholders demand for audit quality as a solution to agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and multiple large shareholders. We find that firms with multiple large shareholders have more propensity to hire a Big4 auditor and provide more audit fees to get higher audit quality. Furthermore, multiple large shareholders will be more incentive to demand for audit quality when the levels of corporate governance or annual report readability are lower. As a consequence, multiple large shareholders and high-quality audits can play a combined role in supervision to add firm value. In addition, the firms with multiple large shareholders are more voluntary to disclosure internal control audit report. Taken together, our results reveal that multiple large shareholders have strong incentive to demand for external monitoring from auditing.更多还原