【摘要】 注册会计师职业责任保险作为会计师事务所的一项风险分散机制,近年来受到我国政府主管部门和公共会计行业组织的关注。一方面,事务所购买注责险可能使审计人员的尽责程度下降,不利于审计质量的维护;另一方面,保险公司作为风险被转移方,有动机对高风险事务所加以约束,以避免审计失败对自身利益造成损失。基于近年来我国证券业务会计师事务所的注责险合约数据,我们发现保险公司对中小型证券所购买注责险收取了显著更高的保费,且更不倾向于与其签订特殊赔偿条款。双重差分模型结果显示,中小型证券所购买注责险后,审计调整(尤其是调减利润的审计调整)幅度显著提高。这些证据支持保险合约对高风险审计中介的治理功能。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, the Chinese government and the public accounting profession have advocated the audit practitioners’ use of professional liability insurance(PLI).As a tool to divert audit firms’ business risk, PLI contracts could decrease auditors’ diligence in conducting audits, which might harm audit quality.Insurance companies might perceive the transfer of audit risks, thus having an incentive to monitor risky audit firms to mitigate potential economic losses related to audit failures.We use proprietary PLI contract data and find that insurance companies charge smaller audit firms a significantly higher price and show a lower tendency to offer favourable indemnity clauses.The difference-in-differences analysis reveals that the magnitude of audit adjustments significantly increases after small audit firms purchase PLI and the effect is dominated by income-decreasing audit adjustments.Our evidence supports the notion that insurance contracts play a governance role for audit intermediaries with a higher risk profile.更多还原