【摘要】 为探究监管约束下农村中小金融机构的资本调整与风险承担,本文将资本监管分为惩罚监管和预警监管,结合银行涉农贷款构建实证模型,使用2014—2019年我国95家农村中小银行的面板数据进行实证分析。研究发现:(1)资本监管对满足监管要求的农村中小金融机构具有显著的约束效应,而对不满足监管要求的农村中小金融机构的约束效应较弱;(2)由于面临较高的涉农贷款违约风险,农村中小银行的资本缓冲越大,资本调整越谨慎;(3)农村中小银行可通过增加资本储备来降低风险承担,其资本和风险水平均存在内生调整的稳定趋势。(4)惩罚监管约束下农村商业银行和村镇银行的风险变动具有异质性。据此,本文建议监管部门适时出台指引,引导农村中小银行建立内部资本约束机制,增强银行的风险量化管理能力。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to explore the capital adjustment and risk-taking of rural small and medium-sized financial institutions under regulatory constraints, this article divides capital regulatory constraints into punitive regulatory constraints and warning regulatory constraints, and builds a theoretical model considering agriculture-related loans of banks. The empirical research is based on the panel data of 95 rural small and medium-sized banks in China from 2014—2019. The results show that:(1) capital regulation has a significant restrictive effect on rural small and medium-sized financial institutions that meet regulatory requirements, while it has a weaker restrictive effect on banks facing regulatory penalties;(2) due to the high default risk of agricultural loans, rural small and medium-sized banks with larger capital buffers will be more cautious in their capital adjustment;(3) rural small and medium-sized banks can reduce risk-taking by increasing capital reserves, and their capital and risk levels have a stable trend of endogenous adjustment;(4) the changes in risk-taking of rural commercial banks and village banks are heterogeneous under punitive regulatory constraint. Therefore, we suggest that regulators should issue documents in due course to guide rural small and medium-sized banks to establish internal capital restraint mechanisms and enhance their ability to quantitative risk management.更多还原