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市场情绪、公司投资与管理者薪酬——基于股票论坛的经验证据
Market Sentiment, Corporate Investment and Executive Compensation:Evidence Based on Stock Forum
【摘要】 本文通过Python收集东方财富网上证指数股吧的发帖信息并构建市场情绪指数,在此基础上以2010—2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本考察市场情绪对公司投资决策与管理者薪酬的影响。研究结果表明,市场情绪与公司投资支出和管理者超额薪酬正相关,而与管理者薪酬-业绩敏感性负相关。对管理者短视程度大的公司而言,市场情绪对公司投资支出与管理者薪酬的影响更大。影响机制分析表明,市场情绪会通过迎合渠道对公司投资决策产生影响,并且市场情绪通过作用于公司投资进而影响管理者薪酬。本文通过构建大数据情绪指数对公司迎合投资的相关研究成果进行了有益的拓展,并对优化管理者薪酬契约设计具有重要借鉴意义。
【Abstract】 In an inefficient capital market, market sentiment can have an impact on corporate investment.Existing literature has found that managers will increase investment spending at high market sentiment, but less attention has been paid to the method of using big data technology to construct market sentiment index.The relationship between corporate over-investment and executive compensation has been studied in the literature, but the managers’ motives to cater to market sentiment and the effect of market sentiment on executive compensation when the capital market is inefficient need to be further studied.With the rapid development of the Internet and big data technology, the massive information resources on the Internet can reflect the changes of market sentiment more directly and accurately.Based on the big data sentiment index, it is meaningful to examine the relationship between market sentiment, corporate investment and executive compensation.This paper uses Python to obtain messages of Eastmoney Shanghai Securities Composite Index Bar and constructs a market sentiment index.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019,this paper examines the relationship between market sentiment and corporate investment spending.This paper further examines how market sentiment affects executive excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity, and examines whether managerial myopia influences the impact of market sentiment on corporate investment spending and executive compensation.The results show that market sentiment is positively related to corporate investment spending, and managers will increase corporate investment spending at high market sentiment.In order to have a deeper understanding of managers’ motives to cater to market sentiment, this paper examines the relationship between market sentiment and executive excess compensation.The empirical results show that market sentiment is positively related to executive excess compensation, which indicates that self-interested managers will cater to market sentiment by increasing investment spending to get higher pay.Furthermore, this paper finds that market sentiment is negatively related to pay-performance sensitivity, which indicates that the effectiveness of compensation contracts decreases when the capital market is inefficient.In addition, for companies with short-horizon managers, market sentiment has a greater impact on investment spending and executive compensation.The mechanism analysis suggests that market sentiment influences corporate investment by catering channel, and market sentiment affects executive compensation by influencing corporate investment.The empirical results indicate that the deep mechanism of the influence of market sentiment on corporate investment lies in that managers have the motive to cater to market sentiment, and managers can obtain excess compensation by increasing corporate investment spending.This paper uses big data technology to crawl and analyze messages of Eastmoney Shanghai Securities Composite Index Bar to construct a market sentiment index, which helps to measure market sentiment directly and accurately.And this paper uses market sentiment index to analyze managers’ investment decisions, which expands the literature of catering investment based on Internet big data.Furthermore, this paper examines the impact of market sentiment on executive excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity and reveals the mechanism of the influence of market sentiment on the effectiveness of compensation contracts, which helps to further understand the effectiveness of compensation contracts when the capital market is inefficient.At the same time, the results have reference meanings for improving the regulatory efficiency of the capital market.Regulators should make full use of the information resources in online forums to monitor investor sentiment, which will help regulators to identify manager self-interested behavior in time.Overall, this paper not only enriches the existing literature on corporate catering investment by constructing a big data sentiment index, but also provides an important reference significance to optimizing the design of executive compensation contracts.
【Key words】 market sentiment; catering investment; excess executive compensation; pay-performance sensitivity; stock forum;
- 【文献出处】 经济管理 ,Business and Management Journal , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年09期
- 【分类号】F832.51;F272.92
- 【被引频次】4
- 【下载频次】1331