【摘要】 本文从地方官员行为的视角考察地方政府如何引导制造业企业"脱虚返实"。使用中国地级市市委书记和制造业上市公司数据,本文发现制造业企业的金融化程度与地方官员任期之间存在U型关系。具体而言,制造业企业的金融化程度随着官员任期的增长而不断下降,在第三年末降至最低点,随后又逐年上升。机制分析表明,地方官员在任期的不同阶段,对当地实体投资的引领强度、对企业融资约束的缓解效应大小及企业感知到的政策稳定程度存在差异。本文的研究证明了地方官员可以发挥积极主动性,引导企业"脱虚返实",支持实体经济发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 The real economy represented by manufacturing industry is the solid foundation of economic development.However, in recent years, the phenomenon that the financial investment of Chinese manufacturing enterprises has increased while the real investment has decreased has attracted wide public attention.In 2019,a total of 1,158 listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges bought 20,788 wealth management products, totaling 1.36 trillion yuan.Considerable money to buy financial products, flow into the financial markets, which is so called “to take off the real to virtual economy form of microscopic, not only may hinder China’s economic transformation and upgrading, but also are more likely to exacerbate financial market volatility, unfavorable to guard against and dissolve the systemic financial risk.Therefore, it is of great practical significance to understand the motivation of the financialization of manufacturing firms and explore the feasible scheme to guide manufacturing firms back to real economy.This paper uncovers how to guide manufacturing firms back to real economy from the perspective of local government behavior.Combing China’s prefecture-level officials’ data and manufacturing listed firms’ data from 2006 to 2017,this paper empirically examines the influence of the tenure of local officials on financialization of manufacturing firms.The results uncover a U-shaped relationship between the tenure of officials and the degree of corporate financialization.Specifically, the degree of financialization of manufacturing firms continues to decline with the growth of officials’ tenure, reaching its lowest point at the end of the third year, and then increases.This conclusion is still robust after considering the circumstances that may affect the conclusion.We further discover the mechanism of the influence of official tenure on corporate financialization.Based on the behavior of officials, the influence of tenure is manifested in two ways: real investment leading and financial constraints.From the perspective of enterprise perception, it is manifested as the influence on the perceived policy stability degree of enterprise.Further analysis suggests that above mechanisms are supported by the phenomenon is existed in relatively small companies and private listed firms, as well as firms in the regions of local officials and young officials.This paper contributes to the current literature in the following ways.First, this paper discusses how local governments drive manufacturing enterprises “back to the real economy” from the perspective of political factors, and empirically finds that there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of financialization of manufacturing enterprises and the tenure of local officials.Therefore, this paper sheds new lights on the influencing factors of enterprise financialization.Second, this paper taps into three specific mechanisms by which the behavior patterns of local officials at different stages of their tenure affect enterprises, namely, the entity investment and financial constraints of firms, as well as the expectation of the policy stability of firms, thus illuminating the meaning of how the tenure of local officials affects the decision-making of micro enterprises.Thirdly, this paper provides clear policy enlightenment and practical significance: starting from the tenure of local officials, it provides a new perspective for guiding firms to real economy.The findings also prove that local governments can take the initiative to support the development of the real economy.更多还原