【摘要】 在减排补贴背景下,构建提供差异化服务的私有港口与部分私有化的公有港口在竞争与合作情形下与政府的两阶段博弈模型,比较港口最优减排率与吞吐量决策、政府最优补贴率与私有化决策、港口目标收益以及环境污染,探讨港口私有化水平、服务差异度对港口、政府决策的影响。研究表明:无论港口是竞争还是合作,减排补贴政策都有很好的激励作用。在港口合作时,环境污染更严重,最优减排补贴率也更高。无论港口是竞争还是合作,私有化政策与港口服务的可替代程度有关。在港口竞争时,随服务差异化程度的减小,政府最优选择是将较高私有化的公有港口转变为完全私有化的港口;在港口合作时,随服务差异化程度的减小,政府最优选择是将较高私有化的公有港口转变为高度公有化的港口。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper studied the game behavior of ports and government under the policy of emission reduction subsidy by developing a two-stage game theory model. The ports involved in this study include one completely private port and one partially privatized public port, which provide differentiated services. In order to evaluate the impacts of the port privatization level and the service differentiation degree on the decisions of port and government, this study investigated the relationships between the optimal emission reduction rate and port throughout, the optimal subsidy rate and port privatization level, as well as the port target profits and environmental pollution. The results show that regardless of competition or cooperation between ports, the emission reduction subsidy policy has a good incentive effect and when the ports cooperate, the environmental pollution is worse, the optimal emission reduction subsidy rate is higher. And whether the ports are in competition or cooperation situation, the privatization level is related to the degree of substitutability of port services. In port competition, the optimal choice for the government is to transform a highly privatized public port into a fully privatized port with the decrease of the service differentiation level. While in port cooperation, the optimal choice is to transform a highly privatized public port into a highly public port with the reduction of the service differentiation level.更多还原