【摘要】 针对制造商主导下的闭环供应链,建立具有风险规避特征零售商的3种双回收渠道模型,运用Stackelberg博弈理论进行建模分析,并利用数值算例对相关结论进行验证和深入分析。研究发现:(1)零售商的风险规避行为会导致自身期望效用的损失,但可提高制造商的期望效用,同时对第三方期望效用的影响趋势不同;(2)不管零售商风险规避程度如何变化,制造商与零售商的期望效用和逆向渠道回收率,均在制造商与零售商双回收模型中取得最大值;(3)当零售商具有较强的风险规避态度时,制造商和第三方双回收模型的逆向渠道回收率最高;(4)零售商的风险规避行为对最优废旧产品转移价格有很大影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 The present study develops three dual-recycling channel models based on considering retailer’s risk aversion in dual-recycling channel closed-loop supply chains(CLSCs) which are led by manufacturers. The Stackelberg game theory is employed and a numerical experiment is conducted to verify the conclusions and for further discussion. The results are proposed as follows:(1)The manufacturer can benefit from the retailer’s risk aversion behavior, while the retailer will endure some expected utilities loss. Besides, the retailer’s risk aversion will exert greatly different impacts on the third-party’s optimal expected utilities under different models.(2)Regardless of the retailer’s risk aversion degree, both manufacturer and retailer can capture the largest expected utilities and return rates when both of them carry on recycling activities.(3)The collection rate is the highest with manufacturer-third-party dual-recycling channel model when the retailer has strong risk aversion attitude.(4)The optimal buyback price is greatly affected by the retailer’s risk aversion.更多还原