【摘要】 不同于以往从信息传播环节的分析师非理性行为角度,基于信息生成环节的管理者机会主义行为视角,立足有效监督假说和市场压力假说,探讨分析师关注对企业股价崩盘风险的作用效果。以2007～2017年A股上市公司为样本,通过多元回归方法研究发现,分析师关注提高了企业未来股价崩盘风险,这一影响在明星分析师关注和行业集中度小的企业更为突出,支持市场压力假说。该结论在利用券商合并这一准自然实验控制潜在内生性问题之后依然成立。进一步分析发现,分析师关注加大了管理者达到短期盈余目标的压力,促使其进行向上盈余管理信息操纵行为。更多还原

【Abstract】 Different from the perspective of irrational behavior of analysts in the information dissemination process, we examine the impact of analyst coverage on stock price crash risk from the perspective of managerial opportunistic behavior in the information generation process. Using 2007～2017 Chinese A share listed firms as samples, we find that analyst coverage increases firms’ future crash risk, and this effect is more prominent in firms followed by star analysts and in firms with lower industry concentration, supporting the market pressure hypothesis. This result is robust after controlling for endogeneity using brokerage mergers as a source of exogenous shock to analyst coverage. Further analyses find that analyst coverage increases the pressure on managers to reach short-term earnings targets, prompting them to conduct information manipulation with upward earnings management.更多还原