【摘要】 随着供应链信息共享程度的逐渐深入,企业对重要信息的掌控能力不断下降,存在信息泄露风险.本文研究了供应链合作在保护私有订单信息和促进供应链协调方面的价值.考虑了由1个供应商和2个零售商组成的供应链,其中在位者零售商拥有关于市场需求的私有信息,进入者零售商无法获取任何市场需求信息,供应商可能有动机将在位者零售商的订单信息泄露给进入者零售商.基于信号博弈理论,构建供应商与在位者零售商合作情形下的信息披露模型,分析供应商的信息披露动机以及信息不披露均衡的存在性和鲁棒性.研究结果表明,在任意市场需求和收益共享率下,供应商与在位者零售商达成合作后,供应商没有动机披露在位者零售商的订单信息.供应商与在位者零售商建立的合作联盟具有较强的稳健性,他们将垄断整个市场,使供应链整体绩效达到最优.更多还原

【Abstract】 With the deepening of information sharing in the supply chain, the enterprise’s ability to control important information decreases, and there exists the risk of information leakage. This paper investigates the value of supply chain collaboration in protecting private order information and promoting supply chain coordination. This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers, where the incumbent retailer has private information about market demand state and the entrant retailer cannot obtain any market demand information. The supplier may have an incentive to leak the incumbent’s order information to the entrant. Based on the signaling game, this paper constructs the information disclosure model under the collaboration between supplier and incumbent, analyzes the supplier’s incentive with information disclosure, and studies the existence and robustness of information non-disclosure equilibrium. It is found that when the supplier and the incumbent collaborate, the supplier has no incentive to disclose the incumbent’s order information under any market demand and revenue-sharing rate. The coalition between the supplier and the incumbent has strong robustness, which will monopolize the whole market and make the overall performance of the supply chain reach the optimal level.更多还原