【摘要】 互联网公益平台试图通过对公益项目不充分审核获取超额收益的行为严重阻碍着互联网公益的健康发展。通过构建互联网公益平台与政府之间的博弈模型并求解发现提高政府对平台该行为的观测与惩罚力度能够有效抑制行为的发生。基于此,从制度工程学的视角设计并分析平台不充分审核行为的惩罚制度,通过MATLAB仿真分析考察关键制度参数对平台制度治理的影响,并调整关键制度参数以达到促使平台选择充分审核行为的目的,为中国现有的互联网公益平台监管提供建议参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Internet public welfare platform’s attempt to obtain excess returns through inadequate audit of public welfare projects seriously hinders the healthy development of Internet public welfare. By building a game model between the Internet public welfare platform and the government and solving it, it is found that improving the government’s observation and punishment of the platform’s behavior can effectively restrain the behavior. Based on this, from the perspective of institutional engineering, this paper designs and analyzes the punishment system of platform’s inadequate auditing behavior, investigates the influence of key institutional parameters on platform’s institutional governance through matlab simulation analysis, and adjusts the key institutional parameters to achieve the purpose of prompting the platform to choose adequate auditing behavior, thus providing suggestions and reference for the supervision of the existing Internet public welfare platform in China.更多还原