【摘要】 多个社保基金管理人可能会不约而同地使用社保基金投资于同一家上市公司并参与公司治理。文章探讨了多个社保基金管理人代理持股对企业创新的影响及作用机理。实证结果表明,多个社保基金管理人代理持股的企业有着更高的创新产出,经过稳健性检验后该结论依然成立。中介模型检验表明,多个社保基金管理人代理持股通过缓解管理人代理成本促进企业创新。进一步研究表明,在非国企和高科技行业企业中,多个社保基金管理人代理持股对企业创新的促进作用更加明显;无论是实质性创新还是策略性创新,多个社保基金管理人代理持股均能发挥促进作用。文章丰富了企业创新影响因素的研究文献,同时丰富了多个社保基金管理人代理持股经济后果的相关文献。更多还原

【Abstract】 Multiple social security fund managers may use social security funds to invest in the same listed enterprise, and participate in corporate governance. This paper discusses the influence of multiple social security fund managers’ proxy shareholding on enterprise innovation and its mechanism. The empirical results show that the enterprises held by multiple social security fund managers have higher innovation output. The conclusion is still valid after robustness test. The mediation model test shows that the proxy shareholding of multiple social security fund managers promotes enterprise innovation by alleviating the agent cost of managers. Further research shows that in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech industries, the role of proxy shareholding by multiple social security fund managers in promoting enterprise innovation is more obvious; whether it is substantive innovation or strategic innovation, multiple social security fund managers’ proxy shareholding can play a promoting role. This paper contributes to the literature on the influencing factors of enterprise innovation. At the same time, it contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of proxy shareholding of multiple social security fund managers.更多还原