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CEO风险偏好、财务困境与企业违规

CEO Risk Appetite, Financial Distress and Corporate Fraud

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【作者】 石晶杨丽

【Author】 SHI Jing;YANG Li;School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Arts and Science;School of Business, Central South University;

【机构】 兰州文理学院经济管理学院中南大学商学院

【摘要】 CEO作为企业战略决策的首席执行官,其自身的认知基础、风险偏好等个人特质会通过影响组织决策与战略布局进而影响企业行为。为此,基于高层梯队理论和舞弊三角理论,以2010-2018年沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,实证检验CEO风险偏好、财务困境与企业违规倾向的关系。结果表明:由风险偏好型CEO任职的企业违规倾向更高,企业财务困境对主效应具有调节作用。

【Abstract】 As the chief person in charge of an enterprise, the chief executive officer’s(CEO’s) own cognitive basis, risk appetite and other personal characteristics will ultimately influence the corporate behavior by influencing organization’s decision and strategic layout. Therefore, based on the upper echelon theory and fraud triangle theory, this paper empirically tested the relationship between CEO risk appetite, financial distress and corporate fraud by using A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2010 to 2018. And the results show that companies with risk preferred CEOs have a higher tendency to fraud, and the corporate financial distress status played a significant positive moderating role.

【基金】 甘肃省哲学社会科学项目(YB138);国家民委人才项目(XBMU-2019-AB-26)
  • 【文献出处】 财经理论与实践 ,The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年04期
  • 【分类号】F832.51;F275;F272.91
  • 【被引频次】15
  • 【下载频次】2684
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