【摘要】 近年来商誉"爆雷"事件频频发生,资本市场对于商誉减值已然风声鹤唳。基于2009—2017年创业板并购事件,理论分析并实证检验了并购业绩承诺对商誉减值模式的影响。研究发现:管理层出于自利的动机往往会操纵商誉减值时机,进行一次性、巨额的"恶性"商誉减值,严重影响了资本市场的秩序;业绩承诺对于商誉减值具有风险识别与风险缓释的作用,降低了管理层操纵减值的能力及动机,当被并企业业绩未达预期时,及时、分次、小额的减值计提,可以确保商誉信息的价值相关性,有助于"良性"商誉减值机制的形成。进一步分析中排除了替代性假设,佐证了业绩承诺的监管作用及机制。因此,建议监管层通过制定政策,推广业绩承诺在高商誉减值风险并购中的应用,并对高商誉企业进行持续监管,以缓释资本市场商誉减值风险。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,“thunderstorm”incidents of goodwill have occurred frequently and the capital market has already been in the fright for the danger of the goodwill impairment. Based on the mergers and acquisitions( M&A) events on the Growth Enterprise Market( GEM) during the years from 2009 to 2017,this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of M&A performance commitment on goodwill impairment mode. The research finds that the management often manipulates the opportunity of goodwill impairment for self-interest,and makes a one-time and huge“malignant”goodwill impairment,which seriously affects the order of the capital market. Performance commitment has the function of risk identification and risk mitigation for goodwill impairment,which reduces the ability and motivation of the management to manipulate the impairment. When the performance of the merged enterprise fails to meet the expectation,timely,fractional and small amount of impairment can ensure the value relevance of goodwill information and contribute to the formation of a“benign”goodwill impairment mechanism. Further analysis excludes the alternative hypothesis,which proves the regulatory role and mechanism of performance commitment. Therefore,it puts forward the suggestion that the regulatory authorities should formulate the policies and promote the application of performance commitment in high goodwill impairment M&A and continuously supervise the high-goodwill enterprises so as to mitigate the risk of goodwill impairment in the capital market.更多还原