【摘要】 上市公司常常利用信息披露策略进行市值管理。本文以中小板上市公司为样本,研究股权质押下的信息披露选择及其市值管理效应。研究发现,股权质押发生后,公司存在通过干预信息披露进行市值管理的行为;公司更倾向于披露好信息,并且在交易日披露更多好消息,在非交易日披露更多坏消息;披露好消息尤其是经营性好消息能发挥提升股价、稳定市值的作用,但试图通过交易日披露好消息、非交易日披露坏消息来稳定市值的效果不显著。上市公司应意识到通过选择性信息披露进行市值管理不仅可能违规,而且效果短暂甚至无效,只有加强公司治理、努力提高经营业绩和核心竞争力才能真正提升股价;监管部门需进一步完善上市公司的信息披露制度,加强信息披露监管。更多还原

【Abstract】 Listed companies often use an information disclosure strategy to manage market value. This paper studies the information disclosure choice and the market reaction of the listed companies in the SME board. It is found that after equity pledge, companies tend to manage market value by intervening information disclosure. Companies are more inclined to disclose good information, and good news is disclosed more on trading days, while bad news is disclosed more on non-trading days. The disclosure of good news, especially business good news, can significantly improve the stock price and stabilize the market value, but the effect of trying to stabilize the market value by disclosing good news on trading days and bad news on non-trading days is not significant. Listed companies should realize that market value management through selective information disclosure is not only illegal, but also short-term or even ineffective. Only by strengthening corporate governance and improving business performance and core competitiveness can improve stock price intrinsically. Regulatory authorities should further improve the information disclosure system of listed companies and strengthen the supervision of information disclosure.更多还原