【摘要】 构建了制造商激励共享供应商创新的成本分担博弈模型,研究了存在两个竞争性制造商和一个共享供应商的供应链结构中,制造商合作与非合作的互动行为对激励共享供应商创新决策的影响问题.研究表明:当市场竞争程度较低时,制造商合作时提供的成本分担比例高于非合作的情形,此时供应商的创新水平和制造商利润也高于非合作情形;当市场竞争程度较高时,制造商合作时提供的成本分担比例低于制造商非合作时的情形,但供应商的创新水平和制造商利润依然高于制造商非合作时的情形;制造商的合作行为降低了市场竞争对制造商与供应商博弈时的消极影响.更多还原

【Abstract】 By using a cost-sharing game model, this paper investigates how interaction behaviors of manufacturers’ cooperation and non-cooperation influence the decisions of motivating shared-supplier innovation in a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and a shared-supplier. The results show that when the competition degree of market is low, the cost-sharing ratio, the shared-supplier’s innovation level and the manufacturers’ profit when the manufacturers collaborate are higher than when they do not. When the market competition degree is high, though the cost-sharing ratio provided in the case of cooperation is less relative to non-cooperation, the innovation level and profitability of the supplier are higher relative to noncooperation.The cooperative behaviors of manufacturers decrease the negative effect of market competition on the game.更多还原