【摘要】 董事高管责任保险产生的治理效应依然扑朔迷离,其对公司高质量审计服务需求的影响亦是难以定论。本文基于代理理论,探讨了董事高管责任保险对公司高质量审计服务需求的影响。研究发现,董事高管责任保险显著提升了公司对高质量审计服务的需求;在进行稳健性检验后,上述结论依然成立;在企业面临的内外部环境存在差异时,董事高管责任保险对公司高质量审计服务需求的作用效果也各不相同;董事高管责任保险的购买通过提高企业代理成本影响了公司的事务所选择,而高质量审计服务发挥了积极的治理作用。本研究不仅有利于更加全面地认识董事高管责任保险的治理效应,对高质量审计的作用、价值和重要性也进行了探讨。更多还原

【Abstract】 The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance are still confusing,and its impact on the company’s demand for high-quality audit services is also inconclusive.Based on agency theory,this paper discusses the influence of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance on the company’s demand for highquality audit services.The study finds that directors’ and officers’ liability insurance has significantly increased the company’s demand for high-quality audit services.The above conclusions are still valid after the robustness test.When the internal and external environment faced by the company are different,the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance also has different effects.The purchase of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance affects the company’s choice of firms by increasing corporate agency costs,and high-quality audit services play a positive role in governance.The paper is not only helpful for a more comprehensive understanding of the governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance,but also discusses the role,value and importance of highquality auditing.更多还原