【摘要】 运用委托代理理论,构建了医院和医生之间的能力激励模型,分析了在信息对称和非对称两种情形下委托代理契约的影响,讨论了医生获得能力激励后可能跳槽的情形。研究结果表明:对称信息和非对称信息下,医院对看重隐性收益、能力强的医生进行能力激励更有效;对称信息条件下医院的期望效用大于非对称信息条件下的期望效用,信息成本随着医生风险规避程度的降低而减少;医生获得能力激励后当其面临更高的固定收益、更高的产出激励或者更好的隐性收益时都有可能选择跳槽。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper sets up an ability incentive model between a hospital and a doctor based on the principal-agent theory. It analyzes the influence of the contract under symmetric information and asymmetric information. It discusses the possibilities of doctor’s job hopping after his?ability promotion. The results of this paper show that it is more effective for the hospital to incentive a doctor with a higher coefficient of recessive income or possesses skilled ability under symmetric information and asymmetric information situations. The expected utility of the hospital under symmetric information is higher than that under asymmetric information. Information cost goes smaller when the risk aversion coefficient of the doctor goes lower. The doctor may choose job hopping when he has the chance to gain higher fixed salary, higher revenue sharing or better recessive income.更多还原